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AIR

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Chief of Base, Munich

Attn: [ ]  
Chief, AB

INFO: AB, Vienna

Operational/OSBOURCE/CHARGE  
Evasion and Escape

Reference: RIC 47139 dated 9 February 1956

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 302B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

1. As a result of conferences with [ ] during his recent visit, Headquarters has reached a decision regarding the future development of the Evasion and Escape line. Generally, we agree to a cautious expansion of existing S & S assets aimed at developing a continuing line from Vienna to the Swiss border. Our decision is based on the understanding that such a goal can be largely accomplished during 1956 through the full time effort of [ ]

2. In discussions with [ ] it was further agreed that AB would assume responsibility for developing the S & S section from Vienna to GRENDAIR. This is necessary because FOB case officers are already fully occupied. We feel that centralizing the responsibility for development of the entire line under the direction of a qualified, experienced case officer eases the burden of additional travel. Some progress was made in developing this section under the GRIGLETT, GSIVIERS and GRALTAR projects. A summary of each of these projects, together with our recommendations for utilization, will be sent in separate dispatches.

3. We consider our present S & S assets to be of somewhat limited value because of the lack of continuity. Until the Vienna and GRENDAIR sections are developed, at least on a skeletal basis, the GRENDAIR and GSBLAED lines are but isolated links of a non-existent chain. We must, however, consider the possibility that cover may become a major <sup>OPERATIONAL</sup> problem in Germany as well as Austria, that future demands on station assets may have a higher priority than development of S & S lines, and that therefore we may be forced to curtail S & S activity. For this reason we desire to concentrate the bulk of case officer effort on developing the overall capability of the S & S line from Vienna to the Swiss border so that every section of the line will contain at least an organizer, wartime manager, and, if possible, a W/T operator. Acquisition of segment managers is of secondary importance, especially until the above assets are developed.

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- 2 -

EE/A-1976

4. We realize that in practice it is not always possible to decide in advance what type of asset will be acquired next. It is necessary to assess each candidate as he comes along, and recruit a satisfactory candidate for the position for which he is best suited. As acceptable candidates for segment managers are developed, we would prefer that recruitment of these candidates be postponed until the more important positions are filled. If operational circumstances make this course of action undesirable, we will consider requests for permission to recruit segment managers when submitted with full details.

5. With the assignment of responsibility for the Vienna section of the E & S line to ABB, a total of 6 organizers, 6 wartime managers, and 6 or 7 W/T operators are needed as the minimum number of assets necessary to consider the E & S line operable. Considering GRBATIK 1 as a segment manager, we have actually recruited only 4 organizers, 1 wartime manager and 1 W/T operator. Allowing for the early recruitment of 2 additional wartime managers and 2 W/T operators, considerable work still remains to be done in order to fill the remainder of the top echelon positions. Despite the Field view that recruitment and initial training of segment managers can be accomplished in three or four meetings, we feel that even the total time required initially to develop segment managers would tie up the case officer unduly, and would curtail development of more necessary top echelon assets. Our first and foremost task must be to acquire outstanding organizers for the GRBATIK and Vienna sections, then to acquire wartime managers and W/T operators throughout the line. Once these basic assets are at hand we at least shall have a nucleus for expansion into a functioning E & S net; without these assets we have nothing but a series of islands, no matter how many segment managers we have recruited.

6. It is our view that the case officer's training role should generally be limited to instructing organizers, who in turn will train their segment managers and wartime manager. Since the function of the wartime manager is crucial to the operating success of the line, it may be necessary for you to supplement the training a wartime manager may receive from his organizer. Beyond this, we do not see how the case officer can afford time to train agents and still develop additional assets.

7. Problems and details relating to W/T training and to the various sections of the E & S line will be handled in separate dispatches.

23 February 1956

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